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[Hume] confidently challenges us to “produce some 
instance, wherein the efficacy is plainly discoverable to the 
mind, and its operations obvious to our consciousness or 
sensation”…. Nothing easier: is cutting, is drinking, is 
purring not ‘efficacy’? (Anscombe 1987, p. 137) 
 
One prominent set of philosophical accounts of causation appeals centrally to dependence 
relations. There are several different kinds of dependence  theories (e.g., Mackie, 1965; Lewis, 
1973; Reichenbach, 1956), but they all share the common idea that causation is to be explicated 
in terms of dependence between cause and effect. Perhaps the most familiar version is a 
counterfactual theory of causation according to which we should understand causal relations in 
terms of counterfactuals like if C hadn’t occurred, then E wouldn’t have occurred. The primary 
rivals to dependence theories are production theories that hold that causation involves some 
process (typically a physical process) that connects cause and effect. Production views often 
characterize the causal contribution in terms of oomph or biff. There are also several kinds of 
production theories (e.g., Salmon, 1984; Dowe, 2000; Wolff, 2007), but they all oppose 
dependence views. As Dowe writes, “Biff theories do not include any theory that appeals to 
counterfactuals or regularities” (MS p. 3). Of course, if C produces E, this might provide the 
basis for true counterfactual statements. But the counterfactual statements themselves don’t 
capture the causal relation, according to production theories. 
One virtue that dependence theories have is that they don’t appeal to metaphysically 
controversial posits like oomph. Humean views of the universe generally eschew such 
metaphysical commitments, and in contemporary philosophy of science, many think that a 
naturalistic worldview has no place for causal oomph. Here, for instance, is a comment from 
James Ladyman: “The preoccupation with the search for ‘genuine causal oomph’ or ‘biff’ to 
settle the competition between different levels of reality derives from this conception of 
causation and microbanging. This is profoundly unscientific and does not fit with contemporary 
physics” (Ladyman 2008, 753; see also Schaffer 2004). Dependence theories, by contrast, do not 
appeal to these kinds of metaphysically controversial causal connections. Indeed, dependence 
theories can remain silent on which mechanisms, if any, are involved in one thing causing 
another.  
In recent years, there has been a fluorescence of experimental work on lay judgments of 
causation (e.g., Fraser and Knobe, 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; Alicke, Rose and Bloom, 
2011; Alicke and Rose, 2012; Rose and Danks, 2012; Sytsma, Livengood and Rose, 2011; 
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Livengood and Rose, 2016; Livengood, Sytsma and Rose, 2017; Danks, Rose and Machery, 
2014; Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado and Knobe, 2015; Rose, 2017; Kominsky and 
Phillips, 2019; Gerstenberg and Icard 2019). Some of this work seems to favor the hypothesis 
that ordinary people use the word cause in a way that corresponds to a production notion (e.g., 
Mandel 2003; Walsh & Sloman 2011; Wolff 2007). For instance, some of this work has explored 
judgments about “redundant causation”, which, as philosophers have noted, poses a problem for 
simple dependence accounts of causation (see, e.g. Hall 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2010). Imagine 
that Suzy and Billy each throw a rock at the same bottle, and Suzy’s rock smashes the bottle a 
second before Billy’s would have. In that case, the bottle’s breaking didn’t depend on Suzy’s 
throw, since the bottle would have broken from Billy’s throw if Suzy hadn’t thrown. Despite 
this, people tend to say that Suzy’s throw caused the bottle to break and Billy’s did not (e.g., 
Shultz, 1982; Mandel 2003; Walsh & Sloman 2011). In addition, in work at the intersection of 
psychology and linguistics, Phillip Wolff has defended a theory of causal verbs that broadly fits 
with a production notion of causation (e.g., Copley & Wolff 2014). 
Thus, some work suggests that the ordinary notion of cause is a production notion rather 
than a dependence notion. However, more sophisticated dependence theories of causation seek to 
accommodate examples of redundant causation without reverting to production (e.g. Lewis 
2000). Moreover, much of the work on causal judgment suggests that the way people ordinarily 
use the word cause corresponds to a dependence notion of causation (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe, 
2009; Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado and Knobe, 2015; Icard, Kominsky and Knobe, 
2017; Kominsky and Phillips, 2019). Some of this work has focused on the role of norm 
violations—both prescriptive and statistical—in causal judgment, which is then taken to be 
explained by people operating with a dependence notion of causation (see Willemsen and Kirfel, 
2018 for a review). As Kominsky and Phillips (2019) put it, “the impact of both statistical and 
moral norms is best explained by changes in the relevance of counterfactual possibilities” (p. 2; 
see also Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; Halpern and Hitchcock, 2014; Icard, Komisky and Knobe, 
2017; though see Samland and Waldmann, 2016). For instance, Phillips, Luguri and Knobe 
(2015) find that when people are given a case where a professor is not allowed to take pens from 
the receptionist’s desk but administrative assistants are, when Professor Smith and an 
administrative assistant both take pens and then the receptionist doesn’t have one to write an 
important message, the extent to which people agree with the statement that “Professor Smith 
caused the problem” is mediated by judgments about whether things would have been different 
had Professor Smith not taken a pen.  
The foregoing work indicates that people’s use of the word “cause” is deeply sensitive to 
counterfactual alternatives in ways suggesting that people operate with a dependence notion of 
causation. Danks (2017) summarizes the situation as follows: 
At a high level, the results of these types of vignette-based experiments are largely 
consonant with the more sophisticated difference-making accounts of singular causation. 
That is, people’s singular causal judgments seem to be sensitive to the truth of particular 
focal counterfactuals that can be derived from (i) causal graphical model representations 
of the general causal relations, and (ii) facts about the specific situation, including 
defaults or “normal” values (p. 210). 
The focus on norm violations has been especially crucial in providing support for the view that 
people operate with a dependence notion of causation. As Phillips and Kominsky (2019) put it:  
Collectively, the evidence…demonstrates that norm violations affect the relevance of 
counterfactual alternatives, and the relevance of counterfactual alternatives affects causal 
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judgments. This relationship holds across variations in the nature of the candidate cause 
and variations in the nature of the norm violation, suggesting that these effects arise from 
general features of causal reasoning, rather than some domain-specific way of reasoning 
about intentional agents, morality, or the intended meaning of the word “cause.” (p. 33) 
One particularly significant finding in vignette studies on causal judgment concerns 
absences. Production theories of causation tend to hold that absences are not causes (e.g., 
Beebee, 2004; Dowe, 2004; but see Wolff et al. 2010). For instance, on one prominent 
production theory of causation, causation requires a transfer of conserved physical quantities, 
e.g., momentum, from one object or event to another (Dowe 2000). But an absence doesn’t have 
any conserved physical quantity to exchange.As a result, on this view, absences are not causes 
(Dowe 2000). Sara Bernstein writes: 
Those who hold oomph or process theories of causation cannot accommodate causation 
by omission1, since there is no thing or event from which energy can be transferred. 
Counterfactual theorists, on the other hand, generally endorse causation by omission, for 
omissions easily fit into counterfactuals of the form “If I hadn’t failed to water the plant, 
the plant wouldn’t have died.” (2016, p. 2579). 
Although production theories tend to maintain that absences are not causes, as several 
philosophers have pointed out, there are many cases in which an absence does seem to be a cause 
(e.g., Schaffer 2000, 2004). For instance, in the example of the plant dying mentioned by 
Bernstein above, it seems plausible to say that the lack of water caused the plant to die. And 
empirical work demonstrates that people tend to think that absences can count as causes (e.g., 
Clarke et al., 2013; Henne, et. al., 2017; Henne et. al., 2019; though see e.g., Livengood and 
Machery, 2007).  
These findings have been extended in important ways. For instance, judgments about 
which absences are causes are impacted by norm violations. To take one example, Clarke et al., 
(2013) gave participants the following case: 
Two cars, one driven by Greta and the other driven by Rachel, were approaching an 
intersection. Greta had a green light. Rachel had a red light, but she wasn’t paying 
attention. The lights stayed that way. Unaware of each other, neither driver stepped on 
the brakes. Both cars collided. 
They found that participants were more inclined to judge that Rachel’s, as opposed to Greta’s, 
not stepping on the breaks was one of the causes of the collision. The pattern of findings appears 
best explained by dependence theories (see also Henne et al 2017, 2019 for further evidence). 
Norm violations appear to guide the selection of counterfactuals even when considering 
absences. The fact that norm violations guide counterfactual selection whether we are 
considering non-absence or absence cases suggests that we operate with a thoroughgoing 
dependence notion of causation (e.g., McGrath 2005; Bernstein 2014).  
A second class of examples, involving double prevention, also suggests that people 
operate with a dependence notion of causation. Consider a situation in which two airplanes are 
on a collision course, but the air traffic controller is about to rectify the situation when he is 
tackled by a crazed coworker, with the result that the airplanes collide. Thus, the crazed 
coworker was a double-preventer; he prevented the air traffic controller from preventing the 
collision. In a case like this, many philosophers have thought that the crazed coworker caused the 
collision, even though the coworker did not directly produce the collision (Godfrey-Smith 2010; 
Hall 2004). The empirical results on prevention are somewhat complex (e.g., Walsh & Sloman 
 
1 In the philosophical literature, “omission” is often used instead of "absence" (see, e.g., Hall and Paul, 2013, p. 4) 
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2011; Lombrozo 2010). But under conditions relevantly similar to the crazed coworker case, 
participants tend to affirm that double-preventers are causes (e.g., Lombrozo 2010, study 1). 
Thus, much of the recent work suggests that common sense thought and talk about 
causation is best explicated in terms of dependence, and is entirely neutral about which if any 
processes hold between a cause and effect. However, one striking feature of almost all the 
experimental work on causal judgment is that it is conducted using the word “cause”. Here are 
some representative examples of the sentences that subjects are asked to evaluate in studies on 
causal judgment: 
“Professor Smith caused the problem” (Knobe and Fraser, 2008) 
“Did Sam cause the bottle to fall off the wall?” (Walsh and Sloman, 2011) 
“Lauren caused the system to crash” (Livengood, Sytsma and Rose, 2017) 
“The attending doctor’s decision caused the patients recovery” (Hitchcock & Knobe 
2009) 
"Alice caused the music to start” (Lombrozo 2010) 
“Billy caused the motion detector to go off” (Kominsky and Phillips 2019) 
“Turnbull caused Poole’s death” (Alicke, Rose and Bloom 2011) 
From a certain perspective, it’s hardly surprising that studies have been conducted using 
the word “cause”. That, after all, is the notion that we’re trying to understand. However, as 
Anscombe (1987) observed, much of our causal discourse is not expressed using the term 
“cause” (which she characterizes as “highly general”), but instead with more special causal terms 
like “scrape”, “burn”, and “knock over” (p. 137). Moreover, it’s plausible that when children 
learn causal notions, they get at least as much exposure to these special causal verbs as they do to 
“cause”. A standard reference source on word frequencies, the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA), suggests that some special causal verbs are more common in 
everyday speech than “cause”. Indeed, “break” all by itself is more common than “cause”.  
 Our hypothesis is that many special causal concepts will diverge in systematic ways from 
the concept CAUSE. Classic work in linguistics on direct versus indirect causation suggests that 
there are important differences, e.g., between “kill” and “cause to die” (e.g., Fodor 1970, Katz 
1970, but see Neeleman and Van de Koot 2012). While the word “cause” might well fit with a 
dependence notion of causation, one that is deeply sensitive to normative considerations, special 
causal verbs like “burn” might fit better with a production-based notion of causation.  Absences 
have been used as a critical test case to distinguish dependence from production notions of 
causation. So absences provide a particularly good source for testing special causal verbs. As a 
result, our first study focuses on whether people are less likely to treat absences as special 
causes. 
For all of our studies, we wanted to present participants with minimal pairs that ask about 
the same event targeting a special causal concept (e.g., burn) or a closely matched question that 
uses cause. Fortunately, linguists have articulated a large set of verbs that allow for this 
alternation. In particular, English has numerous labile causative/inchoative verbs, including burn 
and break. With these verbs, embedding the intransitive alternant inside a periphrastic causative 
(e.g., caused to break) yields a meaning close to the causative alternant (e.g., broke). As Levin 
and Rappaport Hovav (1994) put it, “the meaning of the transitive use of a verb V can be roughly 
paraphrased as ‘cause to V-intransitive’" (p. 35; see also Levin, 1993, pgs. 26-27). For example, 
1a can be paraphrased as 1b: 
 1a. Antonia broke the vase 
1b Antonia caused the vase to break (pgs. 35-36) 
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Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1994) dub such verbs “causative alternation" verbs (p. 36). 
Thus, for a verb like “burn”, we can frame causal statements with the simple form of the 
causative, e.g., X burned Y, or we can frame the statement periphrastically with the word 
“cause”, e.g., X caused Y to burn (see e.g., Dixon 2000 for a general discussion of periphrastic 
causatives).  
Study 1: 
For this first study, we wanted to compare judgments about causal statements where the 
candidate cause (1) either does or does not involve an absence and (2) is expressed either with 
the simple form of a causative or periphrastically with the word “cause”. Our hypothesis is that 
for many special causal verbs, people will be less inclined to judge absences to be special causes, 
when presented with the simple form of the verb. We hasten to note that we are not claiming that 
all special causal verbs will behave this way. But we did try to get a range of different special 
causal verbs that allow for causative alternations.  
If “cause” typically corresponds to a dependence notion of causation then we should 
expect people to be similarly inclined to accept periphrastic causal statements that explicitly use 
the word “cause” regardless of whether the causal candidate involves an absence. By contrast, if 
a special causal verb like “burn” corresponds more closely to a production-based notion of 
causation then people should be less inclined to accept the causal statements about absences 
when the statements are phrased with the simple form of the causal verb. 
 
Methods 
One hundred and fifty-two participants (aged 18-61 years, mean age = 30 years; 81 females) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
 
Materials 
Participants read four different cases, presented in random order. After reading each case, 
participants were shown four statements, randomized using a Latin square, that varied in whether 
the statement was framed using the periphrastic or simple form and in whether the causal 
candidate involved an absence. All statements were presented on an initial screen, and then 
presented again on new single screen for rating (cf. Lombrozo, 2010). Here is an example:  
 
Burn: Jane is spending the afternoon at the beach. Typically, she wears sunscreen when 
she is on the beach but today she forgets to bring any. As a result, her skin becomes 
burned. 
 
You will next be asked to rate the extent to which you agree with the statements below. 
Before making your rating on the next page, please carefully read all of the statements 
below. 
 
The lack of sunscreen caused Jane’s skin to burn. 
The lack of sunscreen burned Jane’s skin. 
The sun caused Jane’s skin to burn. 
The sun burned Jane’s skin.  
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Participants were then taken to a new screen that included only the statements in the same order 
they appeared when initially encountered. Ratings for each statement were made on a 7-pt Likert 
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
The other three cases and corresponding statements are below: 
 
Crack: In a dry climate concrete will crack unless a coat of sealant is applied on top. 
Harry lives in a dry climate and forgets to apply a sealant to his concrete driveway. As a 
result, the concrete cracks. 
The lack of sealant caused the driveway to crack. 
The lack of sealant cracked the driveway. 
The dry climate caused the driveway to crack. 
The dry climate cracked the driveway.  
 
Melt: NASA is testing a rocket which typically has a heat shield surrounding its engine. 
One day the heat shield falls off and as a result a rubber gasket melts.  
The lack of a heat shield caused the rubber gasket to melt. 
The lack a of heat shield melted the rubber gasket. 
The heat from the engine caused the rubber gasket to melt. 
The heat from the engine melted the rubber gasket.  
 
Flood: Jim’s basement window usually prevents water from getting into the cellar. But 
the basement window is being replaced. While his basement window is absent, there is a 
huge storm and the cellar floods.  
The lack of a basement window caused the cellar to flood. 
The lack of a basement window flooded the cellar. 
The storm caused the cellar to flood. 
The storm flooded the cellar. 
 
Results 
Data is available online (https://osf.io/29syb/). The overall pattern, collapsing across all cases, is 
presented in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Overall Effect of Statement (Periphrastic, Simple) by Causal Candidate (Non-Absence, 
Absence) with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
We conducted a 2(Statement: Periphrastic Simple) x 2(Causal Candidate: Non-Absence 
Absence) x 4(Case: Burn, Crack, Melt, Flood) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main 
effect of Statement, F(1, 151)=126.714, p<.001, ηp2=.456 and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
151)=62.830, p<.001, ηp2=.294 but no effect of Case, F(3, 151)=.921, p=.431, ηp2=.006. There 
was also a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
151)=140.825, p<.001, ηp2=.483; Statement and Case, F(3, 151)=3.161, p<.05, ηp2=.021; and 
Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 151)=3.581, p<.05, ηp2 =.023 as well as a three-way interaction 
between case Statement, Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 151)=3.206, p<.05, ηp2=.021. 
Descriptive statistics for individual cases are in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Case Statement Causal Candidate Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Burn Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.88 (1.31) [5.67, 6.09] 
  Absence 5.66 (1.40) [5.44, 5.89] 
 Simple Non-absence 6.06 (1.07) [5.88, 6.23] 
  Absence 4.46 (1.97) [4.14, 4.77] 
Crack Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.80 (1.25) [5.60, 6.00] 
  Absence 5.76 (1.31) [5.55, 5.97] 
 Simple Non-absence 5.30 (1.51) [5.06, 5.54] 
  Absence 4.61 (2.02) [4.28, 4.93] 
Melt Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.73 (1.41) [5.59, 6.01] 
  Absence 5.80 (1.30) [5.50, 5.95] 
 Simple Non-absence 5.71 (1.33) [5.49, 5.92] 
  Absence 4.82 (1.91) [4.51, 5.12] 
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Flood Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.58 (1.41) [5.35, 5.80] 
  Absence 5.71 (1.40) [5.48, 5.93] 
 Simple Non-absence 5.74 (1.27) [5.53. 5.94] 
  Absence 4.55 (1.93) [4.24, 4.86] 
 
 
 
The crucial finding, depicted in Figure 1, is that causal judgments are similar for the causal 
candidate that does not involve an absence but different for the causal candidate that involves an 
absence.  More specifically, the important two-way interaction between Statement and Causal 
Candidate indicates that for the non-absence causal candidate, causal judgments are similar 
whether people are considering the periphrastic (e.g., the sun caused Jane’s skin to burn) or 
simple statement (e.g. the sun burned Jane’s skin). But for the causal candidate involving an 
absence, people are less inclined to agree with the simple causative statement (e.g., the lack of 
sunscreen burned Jane’s skin) than the periphrastic causative (e.g., the lack of sunscreen caused 
Jane’s skin to burn). Thus, in these cases, periphrastic causal statements that explicitly use the 
word “cause” are accepted regardless of whether the causal candidate involves an absence. And 
this fits with familiar dependence theories of causation, which maintain that even absences can 
be causes. But when the special causal verb is used in its simple form, the situation is very 
different. In those cases, absences are less likely to be treated as causes. This fits with familiar 
production theories of causation which deny that absences are causes. 2  Further, the three-way 
interaction we found suggests that the type of verb, in particular the type of verb in the simple 
statements, behave similarly though somewhat differently.  But the important point is that people 
are much less inclined to apply them to absences in comparison to “cause”.  
As we documented above, much of the experimental work on causal attribution supports 
the view that we operate with a thoroughgoing dependence notion of causation. But that, we 
suggest, is because the previous studies had a strictly limited budget of causal verbs. Once we 
take in a wider range of causal verbs we get a much different take on causal cognition, which is 
that production-based notions do play an important role in causal judgment.  
 
Study 2 
 
The findings from study 1 support our hypothesis that many special causal concepts will diverge 
in systematic ways from the concept CAUSE.  More specifically, we find that for many special 
causal verbs, people are less likely to judge absences to be special causes.  In study 1, we 
selected the special causal verbs ourselves. We did this because we wanted an existence proof for 
the idea that at least for some special causal verbs, absences would be less likely to be treated as 
causes. Again, we would emphasize that we are not proposing that no special causal verbs will 
allow absences as causes. For instance, “kill” is a special causal verb that might permit absences 
as causes, as in the sentence “the lack of water killed the plants”.  
 
2 To check for individual differences, we took the difference between absence and non-absence for both periphrastic 
and simple statements.  We then took the difference of these two resulting differences and plotted a histogram to 
check whether the distribution might be multimodal.  The resultant distribution was instead a normal distribution. 
We thank an anonymous referee for urging us to check this here and in subsequent studies. 
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Although we are not making universal claims about special causal verbs, in study 2 we 
wanted to test a sample of special causal verbs that we didn’t handpick. To this end, we 
assembled all of the causative/inchoative alternation verbs from Levin’s (1993) extensive list. 
This resulted in a list of 311 verbs.  We then obtained frequency information on the use of each 
verb from COCA and ordered the list of verbs by frequency.3  Including “cause” for reference, 
here are the top twelve verbs ordered by frequency: 
 
Table 2: Causal Verb Frequencies from Levin (1993) 
 
Verb Frequency 
turn 477668 
move 430324 
change 327637 
grow 248803 
open 247043 
break 213364 
cause 170629 
increase 137709 
close 136431 
drop 134220 
fill 125249 
worry 119256 
improve 94764 
 
Excluding “cause”, we then randomly selected four verbs from the list in Table 2. The verbs that 
the random selection function returned were: turn, grow, increase and drop.  These served as the 
target verbs in study 2. 
 
A second issue concerning study 1 is the mean responses to cases involving absences. If special 
causal verbs tap into a production-based notion of causation, then one might wonder why people 
are overall somewhat inclined to judge absences as special causes in study 1.  We emphasize that 
our hypothesis is that people will be less inclined to accept the simple statement of the special 
causal verb in cases involving absences.  Nonetheless, it is somewhat surprising that people find 
the simple statement, “The lack of sunscreen burned Jane’s skin”, even somewhat acceptable, 
especially since we suspect that for many readers this statement hits the ear like nails on a 
chalkboard. So what’s going on?  Pragmatic factors might be leading to some distortion. A 
principle of charity might incline one to “somewhat agree” to a sentence that is strictly speaking 
incorrect, but captures something significant about a situation. For instance, suppose you are 
walking around Manhattan and someone stops you to ask, “Is the Empire State Building in Fifth 
Avenue?”. Only a jerk would say “no”. Instead, we suspect that your likely response will be 
“yes”, even while knowing full well that the Empire State Building is on Fifth Avenue, not in 
Fifth Avenue. In order to encourage stricter evaluation of the sentences, in study 2 we framed the 
question as a query from someone trying to learn English. We anticipated that such a context 
might lead to a tightening up of standards. In addition, to reduce the potential effects of repeated 
 
3 Some verbs on the list e.g., volatize, vitrify, lignify, turned up no frequency data in COCA.  
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exposure to these unusual constructions, each subject only saw one vignette. Thus, using our new 
stock of causal verbs, in study 2 we investigate whether people are less inclined to view absences 
as special causes when considering a single case in a context where they are judging the accuracy 
of statements in response to queries from an English learner.  
 
Methods 
Two hundred and forty-three participants (aged 18-61 years, mean age = 26 years; 101 females) 
were recruited from Prolific and tested in Qualtrics.  
 
Materials 
Participants completed a survey in which they were randomly assigned to read one of four cases.  
After reading the case, participants were shown four statements, randomized using a Latin 
square, that varied in whether the statement was framed using the periphrastic or simple form 
and in whether the causal candidate involved an absence. On the same screen, they then rated the 
appropriateness of each statement presented in the same order. Here is an example:  
 
Turn: Joan’s robotic vacuum has a built-in controller that keeps it from falling down 
stairs. It works by detecting where the floor ends and then activating a motor which 
moves the wheels to the left. The vacuum approaches the stairs. The controller detects 
that the floor has ended and activates the motor. As a result, the vacuum turns away from 
the stairs. 
 
Imagine someone is trying to learn English from you and asks you to indicate how 
accurate each of these statements is: 
 
The lack of floor turned the vacuum. 
The lack of floor caused the vacuum to turn. 
The controller turned the vacuum. 
The controller caused the vacuum to turn. 
 
Participants then rated each statement on a 7-point scale ranging from completely inaccurate to 
completely accurate.  As a comprehension check, participants were then taken to a new screen 
where they were asked to evaluate a false statement.  The story remained at the top of the page 
and they were asked: 
 
Now imagine the person trying to learn English from you asks you to indicate how 
accurate this statement is: 
 
The metal casing caused the vacuum to turn. 
 
Ratings were made on the same 7-point scale. 
 
Here are the other three cases and their accompanying statements: 
 
Grow: For a science project, Susie needed to produce mold. She decided to use bread to 
do this. She lives in a humid climate so that will help, but it takes too long. So she 
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decides to put the bread in a drawer where there is no light. As a result, within two days, 
mold grows on the bread. 
The lack of light grew the mold. 
The lack of light caused the mold to grow. 
Susie grew the mold. 
Susie caused the mold to grow. 
Comprehension check: The drawer handle caused the mold to grow. 
 
Increase: The water pump kicks on when water levels in the pool drop. Water flow is 
regulated by a valve that plugs the pump hose. So that water can flow from the pump into 
the pool, the valve automatically releases the plug when enough pressure builds. One day, 
water pressure from the pump builds and the valve releases the plug. As a result, the 
water level in the pool increases. 
The lack of a plug increased the water level. 
The lack of a plug caused the water level to increase. 
The pump increased the water level. 
The pump caused the water level to increase. 
Comprehension check: The diving board caused the water level to increase. 
 
Drop: Mark is flying his hot air balloon, which has four sandbags that he can release 
when he wants to gain altitude. Each sandbag is held by a small platform jutting out from 
the basket.  The sandbags are released by pressing a button that retracts the platform into 
the basket. There is only one sandbag left, and Mark wants to go even higher, so he 
presses the button. As a result, the platform is retracted into the basket and the sandbag 
drops. 
The lack of a platform dropped the sandbag. 
The lack of a platform caused the sandbag to drop. 
Mark dropped the sandbag. 
Mark caused the sandbag to drop. 
Comprehension check: The sky caused the sandbag to drop. 
 
Results 
Data is available online (https://osf.io/zt87f/). The overall pattern of findings are shown in Figure 
2.  Here we include the overall pattern of results including all participants and only those 
participants who passed the comprehension question. 
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Figure 2: Overall Effect of Statement (Periphrastic, Simple) by Causal Candidate (Non-Absence, 
Absence) with 95% Confidence Intervals Including All Participants (Left) and Only Those Who 
Passed the Comprehension Question (Right) 
 
We conducted a 2(Statement: Periphrastic, Simple) x 2(Causal Candidate: Non-Absence, 
Absence) x 4(Case: Turn, Grow, Increase, Drop) mixed ANOVA with Statement and Causal 
Candidate as within-subjects factors and Case as a between-subjects factor. There was a main 
effect of Statement, F(1, 239)=75.263, p<.001, ηp2=.239 and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
239)=35.180, p<.001, ηp2=.117 but no effect of Case, F(3, 239)=.502, p=.681, ηp2=.006. There 
was also a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
239)=14.753, p<.001, ηp2=.058; Statement and Case, F(3, 239)=4.275, p<.05, ηp2=.051; and 
Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 239)=12.012, p<.001, ηp2 =.131 as well as a three-way 
interaction between case Statement, Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 239)=2.998, p<.05, 
ηp2=.036. We found that ratings for the false statements were overall very low (M=1.95, 
SD=1.46), suggesting that people were attentive and understood the dependent measure. 
Removing those who gave a 4 or higher in response to the false statements, we end up with a 
very similar model.4  Descriptive statistics for individual cases— including all participants and 
excluding those who gave a 4 or higher on the comprehension check—are in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Study 2 Descriptive Statistics for All Participants (Overall) and Only Those Who Passed 
the Comprehension Question (Comp. Pass) 
   Overall  Comp. Pass   
Case Statement Causal 
Candidate 
Mean (SD) 95% CI Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Turn Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.07 (1.61) [4.68, 5.45] 5.19 (1.68) [4.75, 5.63] 
  Absence 5.17 (1.38) [4.73, 5.60] 5.23(1.48) [4.72, 5.75] 
 
4 Forty-two participants gave a rating of 4 or higher on the false statements.  Analyzing data from the remaining 201 
participants, the results from the mixed ANOVA are as follows: There was a main effect of Statement, F(1, 
197)=69.091, p<.001, ηp2=.260 and Causal Candidate, F(1, 197)=33.390, p<.001, ηp2=.145 but no effect of Case, 
F(3, 197)=.481, p=.696, ηp2=.007. There was also a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal 
Candidate, F(1, 197)=17.747, p<.001, ηp2=.083; Statement and Case, F(3, 197)=4.103, p<.01, ηp2=.059; and Causal 
Candidate and Case, F(3, 197)=12.105, p<.001, ηp2 =.156 as well as a three-way interaction between case Statement, 
Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 197)=2.905, p<.05, ηp2=.042. 
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 Simple Non-absence 4.60 (1.83) [4.15, 5.05] 4.70 (1.89) [4.18, 5.23] 
  Absence 3.47 (1.79) [3.02, 3.92] 3.19 (1.60) [2.69, 3.68] 
Grow Periphrastic  Non-absence 4.82 (1.58) [4.44, 5.20] 5.19 (1.68) [4.39, 5.21] 
  Absence 5.73 (1.36) [5.29, 6.16] 5.74 (1.35) [5.26, 6.22] 
 Simple Non-absence 4.32 (1.85) [3.88, 4.77] 4.33 (1.88) [3.84, 4.82] 
  Absence 4.16 (1.63) [3.72, 4.60] 4.09 (1.66) [3.63, 4.56] 
Increase Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.24 (1.47) [4.85, 5.63] 5.14(1.51) [4.61, 5.61] 
  Absence 4.21 (2.02) [3.76, 4.65] 4.21 (2.14) [3.67, 4.75] 
 Simple Non-absence 4.97 (1.65) [4.51, 5.43] 4.93 (1.77) [4.37, 5.49] 
  Absence 3.95 (1.89) [3.49, 4.40] 3.85 (1.86) [3.34, 4.38] 
Drop Periphrastic  Non-absence 5.84 (1.38) [5.47, 6.22] 5.95 (1.33) [5.55, 6.34] 
  Absence 4.29 (1.99) [3.86, 4.71] 4.19 (2.04) [3.73, 4.65] 
 Simple Non-absence 5.29 (1.76) [4.85. 5.73] 5.40 (1.77) [4.92, 5.87] 
  Absence 3.40 (1.73) [2.96, 3.83] 3.28 (1.74) [2.83, 3.72] 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we replicated the overall pattern of findings in study 1 using a new stock of special causal 
verbs.5 Moreover, in contrast to study 1 where we found that participants were somewhat 
inclined to agree with the simple statement concerning absences, here we found that people were 
somewhat inclined to regard those statements as inaccurate. By switching to a single case and 
having participants evaluate statements in response to queries from an English learner it seems 
that we were able to reduce some pragmatic pressures present in our initial study that may have 
led to an overall inflation in responses.  
 
  Using a new selection of special causal verbs, we continue to find evidence suggesting 
that while “cause” might express dependence, special cause verbs might express production 
relations.  The crucial two-way interaction between the Statement and Causal Candidate supports 
this. And, as in study 1, we also found a three-way interaction.  Yet while each special causal 
verb might behave somewhat differently, they each behave similarly in that people are much less 
inclined to apply them, in comparison to “cause”, in cases involving absences.   
 
Study 3 
Our first two studies looked at judgments involving putative causation by absence. Philosophers 
have invoked causation by absence as undermining production theories of causation. And 
psychologists have found that participants are quite happy to allow causation by absence. This is 
then taken to suggest that ordinary judgments of causation are guided by a dependence notion 
rather than a production notion. Although causation by absence is the most prominent case 
brought against production theories, another important alleged counterexample, as noted above, 
involves double prevention. It seems that the crazed coworker caused the collision of the 
 
5 We again checked for individual differences in the same way we did in study 1 (see fn 3) and found that the 
resulting histogram was normally distributed.  
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airplanes by preventing the air traffic controller from preventing the collision. Lombrozo’s 
(2010) work corroborates this intuition. In cases where a person intentionally prevents someone 
from preventing an outcome, Lombrozo finds that people endorse causation by prevention.  Here 
is one of the cases she tests: 
 
Alice, Bob, and Carol have spent the afternoon juggling and listening to music. At the 
moment, Alice is juggling and the music is not playing. Alice wants to listen to music, so 
she deliberately throws a juggling ball, which heads straight for the stereo’s ‘on’ button. 
But while Alice’s ball is in the air, Bob starts pulling on the power cord connecting the 
stereo to the outlet. If Bob unplugs the cord, it will prevent Alice’s ball from turning on 
the stereo and starting the music. However, Carol wants the music to play, so she 
deliberately steps on the power cord just before Alice’s ball hits the ‘on’ button, 
preventing Bob’s pull from unplugging the stereo. As a result of these events, the music 
starts to play. 
 
After reading the case, participants are asked to rate the propriety of statements like “Alice 
caused the music to start” and “Carol caused the music to start”. 
As Lombrozo (2010) explains, “in this scenario, the outcome (the music starting) depends 
on both the actions of Alice (the ‘‘transference” cause) and on the actions of Carol (the 
‘‘dependence” cause). Thus according to a dependence theory, both Alice and Carol can 
appropriately be judged causes of the outcome. However, only Alice’s actions transfer a force or 
quantity to the stereo. On a transference [i.e., production] theory, Alice is the only cause of the 
outcome.” (p. 311). Lombrozo finds that in the case above, where both Alice and Carol act 
intentionally, people are inclined to judge both of their actions as causes of the music starting.  
And this fits with the view that people are applying a dependence-based notion of causation, at 
least under conditions of intentional action.   
 We offer a different proposal.  Lombrozo’s task solicited causal judgments about 
periphrastic causal statements like “Carol caused the music to start”. We suspect that this 
phrasing plays an essential role in facilitating propriety judgments that appear to support the 
view that people operate with a dependence-based notion of causation under conditions of 
intentional action. By contrast, if participants were presented with the simple form of the 
statement featuring the special causal verb – in this case “start” – we predict that people will be 
less inclined to judge that Carol started the music.  Such a finding would cohere with our 
proposal that special causal verbs often express a production-based notion of causation. 
 
Methods 
Forty-nine participants (aged 18-63 years, mean age = 29 years; 22 females) were recruited from 
Prolific and tested in Qualtrics.  
 
Materials 
Participants were presented with the above case featuring Alice, Carol and Bob.6  After reading 
the case, participants received the same prompt as they did in study 2 where they were asked to 
 
6 Lombrozo’s study 1 also included another vignette, involving submitting an order for pens. But the relevant verbs 
in that vignette don't allow causative alternation, and so we focused on the music vignette. 
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imagine an English learner asking about the accuracy of various statements.  This appeared as 
follows:  
 
Imagine someone is trying to learn English from you and asks you to indicate how 
accurate each of these statements is: 
 
Carol started the music. 
Carol caused the music to start. 
Alice started the music. 
Alice caused the music to start. 
 
Participants then rated each statement on a 7-pt Likert scale ranging from completely inaccurate 
to completely accurate.  Lastly, they were then taken to a new screen with the story remaining at 
the top and were asked the following comprehension question: 
 
 Who stepped on the cord? (Alice/Bob/Carol) 
 
 
Results 
Data is available online (https://osf.io/t3r67/). We conducted a 2(Statement: Periphrastic Simple) 
x 2(Causal Candidate: Alice, Carol) repeated measures ANOVA, excluding the three people who 
missed the comprehension question.7 There was a main effect of Statement, F(1, 45)=4.218, 
p<.05, ηp2=.086 and an effect of Causal Candidate, F(1, 45)=10.520, p<.01, ηp2=.189. There was 
also a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
45)=11.711, p<.01, ηp2=.207. The results are shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
7 Including those who failed the comprehension question in the data analysis produces the same basic results: there 
is a main effect of main effect of Statement, F(1, 48)=4.639, p<.05, ηp2=.088, an effect of Causal Candidate, F(1, 
48)=12.284, p<.01, ηp2=.204 and a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal Candidate (Alice 
Periphrastic: M=5.00, SD=1.89; Alice Simple: M=5.33, SD=1.94; Carol Periphrastic: M=4.51, SD=2.00; Carol 
Simple=3.24, SD=1.96) , F(1, 48)=11.164, p<.01, ηp2=.189.   
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Figure 3: Effect of Statement (Periphrastic, Simple) by Causal Candidate (Alice, Carol) with 
95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
Here we replicate Lombrozo’s (2010) finding that when both Alice and Carol act intentionally, 
people are inclined to judge that they caused the music to start.  But this only obtains when 
evaluating the periphrastic statement that explicitly features the word “cause”.  When 
considering the simple form of the statement featuring only the special causal verb “start”, the 
situation is very different.  People are inclined to judge that the non-production causal candidate, 
Carol, did not start the music.8 Thus, just as people are disinclined to regard absences are causes 
for many special causal verbs, here we find people disinclined to regard double preventers as 
causes. As with the results of the previous experiments on causation by absence, the results of 
this study fit with our proposal that special causal verbs often express production-based notions 
of causation. 
Study  4  
Studies 1 through 3 indicate that in many cases, special causal verbs do not conform to the 
predictions of dependence theories of causation. Previous work on absences and double 
prevention indicate that people will assent to “X caused Y to φ” when X is an absence or a 
double preventer. We replicated this familiar result for a wide range of special causal verbs, but 
also showed that while people assented to “X caused Y to φ”, they were less inclined to assent to 
“X φ-ed Y”. This shows a characteristic pattern of failure of entailment. The fact that X caused Y 
to break doesn’t seem to entail that X broke Y, in cases of absences and double preventions. 
 
8 We again checked for individual differences in the same way we did in our previous studies and found that the 
resulting histogram was normally distributed. 
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 A natural idea is that the notion of cause is a more general notion which captures 
something common among all the special causal verbs. Indeed, Anscombe (1987) seems to treat 
the situation in this way: when she considers “cause” in contrast to the special causal verbs, she 
maintains that “the word “cause” itself is highly general” (p. 137). The idea would be that there’s 
some abstract relation that is shared across all the special causal verbs and is represented by 
“cause”. So, even though our earlier studies show that there is a failure of entailment from “X 
caused Y to φ” to “X φ-ed Y”, one might expect entailments in the other direction. On this view, 
if X broke Y holds, then so should X caused Y to break. However, another possibility is that 
“cause” is a verb that is special in its own way, shaped by a variety of human interests, and that it 
doesn’t have a pure general content that is common across all of these different special causal 
verbs.  
In the recent empirical literature on causal judgment, some have proposed that the verb 
“cause” is distinctively tied to responsibility (e.g., Livengood, Sytsma and Rose, 2017; Sytsma et 
al, 2019). Summing up some of this research, Hitchcock (2007), writes: 
These results, if taken at face value, suggest that causal attribution is not conceptually 
prior to the evaluation of moral responsibility, but is in fact more tightly bound up with 
judgments of moral responsibility: we are more strongly inclined to judge that an agent’s 
actions caused some negative outcome when we judge the agent to be blameworthy in 
other respects. In this regard, ordinary causal attributions are not purely objective, since 
they depend, in part, upon our value judgments (p. 513). 
A related idea comes from ancient philosophy, where it is suggested that the notion of cause 
(aition) deployed in ancient Greek philosophy means responsible for and is closely associated 
with legal contexts (e.g., Sedley, 1988, p. 115). If that’s so, then we might find cases where 
participants accept a statement that uses a verb like “crack” in its simple form (X cracked Y), 
while being less inclined to accept a statement that uses the periphrastic alternant (X caused Y to 
crack) (because responsibility is absent). Thus, in this next study, we wanted to see whether there 
are cases in which participants would agree to the simple causative statement but not to the 
corresponding periphrastic statement using “cause”.  
We designed this study with the role of responsibility in mind and so created cases where 
there is a causal chain leading to a bad outcome.9 The chain involved a distal agent and a 
proximal agent and ultimately the bad outcome. We made it so that it is intuitively plausible that 
the distal agent is responsible for the outcome, but the proximal agent is not. We predict here that 
since the distal agent would be viewed as responsible, participants would be more inclined to 
affirm the periphrastic form of the causal statement, “X caused Y to φ” for the distal agent as 
compared to the proximal agent. By contrast, when the causal statement is made with the simple 
form of the verb, “X φ-ed Y”, the situation is different. For many of these special causal verbs, 
including the verbs we have been investigating, we suspect that the specified relation requires 
proximity between the cause and the effect.10 As a result, we predict that when presented with a 
statement using the simple form of the causal verb (e.g., “X cracked Y”), participants will think 
 
9 We emphasize that we are not committing ourselves to the view that responsibility captures everything there is 
about causal attribution using the word "cause". Rather, we're drawing on the earlier work primarily as a basis for 
generating materials to test for a dissociation between "cause" and special causal verbs. 
10 This means that we do not expect these causal relations to be transitive. This fits with classic views about direct 
causal verbs (see, e.g., Shibatani 1976). While some theorists have maintained that causal relations are transitive, 
this is not an essential commitment of production theories of causation (see, e.g. Hall and Paul 2013, p. 220).  
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that the relation holds between the proximal agent and the outcome, but not between the distal 
agent and the outcome.  
 
Methods 
One hundred and forty-two participants (aged 18-64 years, mean age = 31 years; 65 females) 
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
 
Materials  
As in study 1, participants read four different cases, presented in random order. After reading 
each case, participants were shown four statements, randomized using a Latin square, that varied 
in whether the statement was (1) framed with the simple form of the causative or periphrastically 
with “cause” and in whether (2) the causal candidate was an initiating or intermediary factor. 
Again, after reading each statement, they were then taken to a new screen where they rated 
agreement with the statements on a 7-pt Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. Here are the cases with the 4 different statements (which we represent here with a 2 x 2 
table, but the participants just got the statements): 
 
Crack: Gus is drunk. He almost fell as he stood up from his stool, but grabbed the coat 
sleeve of Billy and Billy fell into a painting. As a result, the frame of the painting 
cracked. 
 
 Distal Proximal 
Periphrastic Gus caused the frame to crack Billy caused the frame to crack 
Simple Gus cracked the frame Billy cracked the frame 
 
 
Bend: A blue car hit a red car, propelling it into a street sign. As a result, the street sign 
bent. 
 
 Distal Proximal 
Periphrastic The blue car caused the sign to 
bend 
The red car caused the sign to bend. 
Simple The blue car bent the sign. The red car bent the sign. 
 
 
Spill: Suzy sneaks up on Andy and blasts a loud air horn as a practical joke. A startled 
Andy jumps. As a result, the drink he was holding spills. 
 
 Distal Proximal 
Periphrastic Suzy caused the drink to spill. Andy caused the drink to spill. 
Simple Suzy spilled the drink. Andy spilled the drink. 
 
 
Break: A cyclist is speeding around a turn on a path and hits a pedestrian who then falls 
into a railing. As a result, the railing breaks. 
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 Distal Proximal 
Periphrastic The cyclist caused the railing to 
break. 
The pedestrian caused the railing to 
break. 
Simple The cyclist broke the railing. The pedestrian broke the railing. 
 
 
Results 
Data is available online (https://osf.io/gyzun/). The overall pattern across cases is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Overall Effect of Statement (Periphrastic, Simple) by Causal Candidate (Distal, 
Proximal) with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
We again conducted a 2(Statement: Periphrastic, Simple) x 2(Causal Candidate: Distal, 
Proximal) x 4(Case: Bend, Crack, Spill, Break) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main 
effect of Statement, F(1, 141)=62.207, p<.001, ηp2=.306 but no effect of Causal Candidate, F(1, 
141)=.195, p=.660, ηp2=.001 and no effect of Case, F(3, 141)=1.222, p=.301, ηp2=.009. There 
was also a significant two-way interaction between Statement and Causal Candidate, F(1, 
141)=405.524, p<.001, ηp2=.742; Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 141)=3.115, p<.05, ηp2=.022; 
but no interaction between Statement and Case, F(3, 141)=2.169, p=.091, ηp2 =.015. Lastly, there 
was a three-way interaction between case Statement, Causal Candidate and Case, F(3, 
141)=7.054, p<.001, ηp2=.048. Descriptive statistics for individual cases are in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Study 4 Descriptive Statistics 
Case Causal Candidate Statement Mean 
(SD) 
95% CI 
Bend Distal  Periphrastic 5.56 (1.61) [5.29, 5.82] 
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  Simple 3.57 (2.18) [3.21, 3.93] 
 Proximal Periphrastic 4.58 (2.02) [4.25, 4.91] 
  Simple 5.46 (1.79) [5.16, 5.75] 
Crack Distal Periphrastic 5.98 (1.35) [5.75, 6.20] 
  Simple 3.44 (2.00) [3.11, 3.76] 
 Proximal Periphrastic 3.72 (1.98) [3.39, 4.04] 
  Simple 5.48 (1.75) [5.21, 5.73] 
Spill Distal Periphrastic 6.07 (1.24) [5.86, 6.27] 
  Simple 3.18 (2.04) [2.84, 3.52] 
 Proximal Periphrastic 3.55 (2.04) [3.21, 3.88] 
  Simple 5.83 (1.43) [5.59, 6.06] 
Break Distal Periphrastic 5.95 (1.38) [5.72, 6.18] 
  Simple 3.82 (2.13) [3.47, 4.17] 
 Proximal Periphrastic 3.86 (1.97) [3.53, 4.18] 
  Simple 5.42 (1.67) [5.14, 5.70] 
 
 
 
We find exactly the sharp dissociation we predicted. The crucial two-way interaction 
between Statement and Causal Candidate indicates that when asked to evaluate the statement that 
uses the simple form of the causative (e.g., X broke the railing), people were more inclined to 
agree that the proximal agent was the special cause than that the distal agent was. This fits with 
the idea that the special causal verb denotes a particular relation, which obtains between the 
proximal agent and the outcome but not between the distal agent and the outcome. By contrast, 
when asked to evaluate the periphrastic statement using the word “cause” (e.g., X caused the 
railing to break), people were more inclined to agree that the distal agent was the cause than that 
the proximal agent was.11 This fits with the suggestion that the verb “cause” is semantically 
linked to responsibility, since in all of the vignettes, the distal agent is intuitively responsible for 
the bad outcome and the proximal agent is not intuitively responsible. Of course, we didn’t 
directly manipulate responsibility but instead manipulated whether the causal candidate was 
distal or proximal and whether the special causal verb was used in its simple form or 
periphrastically with “cause”. But given the range of research suggesting that “cause” is 
semantically linked to responsibility (e.g., Sytsma, Livengood and Rose, 2011; Livengood, Rose 
and Sytsma, 2017; Sytsma et. al., 2019), we think it is reasonable to take the current findings, 
indirect as they are, as building upon that work. However, the more important point for our 
purposes is that this study shows that the notion of cause is not simply a more general relation 
that holds for all the specific relations indicated by special causal verbs. In particular, we find 
that for many special causal verbs, people’s judgments do not respect an entailment from “X φ-
ed Y” to “X caused Y to φ”. 
We also note that here, as in studies 1 and 2, we found a three-way interaction.  In 
particular, this interaction is such that it suggests that while each special verb behaves similarly, 
each is also somewhat unique.  Importantly, our findings together suggest that “cause” and a 
 
11 We again checked for individual differences in the same way we did in the previous studies.  The difference here 
was that instead of taking the difference between absence and non-absence for both periphrastic and simple 
statements, we instead took the difference between proximal and distal for both of these statements. We then took 
the difference of these two resulting differences and found that the resulting histogram was normally distributed. 
21 
 
range of special causal verbs are treated differently: “cause” appears largely consonant with a 
dependence based notion of causation while at the same time being tied into notions of 
responsibility; special causal verbs look to largely tap into a production based notion of 
causation, perhaps even, as we suggest below, reflecting a plurality of unique production 
relations.  
 
General discussion  
A range of previous work on causal judgment indicates that the everyday notion of causation 
coheres with dependence theories of causation. Part of what makes this result philosophically 
significant is that dependence theories of causation take on fewer metaphysical commitments 
than production accounts. For instance, the conserved quantity account of causation is hard to 
apply to causal statements in sciences like biology and psychology, and this is taken to be a 
serious strike against it (see e.g. Craver & Tabery 2019). And insofar as a production account 
invokes a metaphysically controversial notion of oomph, this will render such accounts 
philosophically problematic. By contrast, dependence theories can be broadly neutral about 
mechanisms that link cause and effect, and so these theories are insulated from such problems. 
As a result, insofar as the commonsense notion of causation is a dependence notion, 
commonsense is similarly insulated from problematic commitments.  
 Our studies suggest that it’s premature to endorse this picture of commonsense causal 
thought as metaphysically neutral. Previous studies suggest that the relation picked out by 
“cause” is a relation of dependence rather than production. Most prominently, people judge 
absences and double preventers to be causes, and this is hard to square with production accounts 
of causation but is easily accommodated by a dependence theory. However, almost all of these 
studies on causal judgment examined the issue by asking people for their judgments about causal 
statements that explicitly use the word “cause”. We expanded the investigation of causal 
judgment by including special causal verbs like “burn”, “turn”, “crack” and “start”.  
In studies 1 and 2, we replicated the basic finding that people will affirm absences as 
causes, as in “The lack of sunscreen caused Jane’s skin to burn”; but we also found people were 
less inclined to affirm a closely matched statement “The lack of sunscreen burned Jane’s skin”. 
In study 3, we replicated Lombrozo’s finding that when asked to evaluate a sentence about a 
double preventer,  “Carol caused the music to start”, participants tended to rate this as accurate; 
but we also found that people were less inclined to affirm the closely matched simple causal 
statement, “Carol started the music”. Thus, for absences and double preventers, we found a 
systematic failure of entailment: across a wide range of special causal verbs people assented to 
“X caused Y to φ”, but  were less inclined to assent to “X φ-ed Y”. In our fourth and final study, 
we looked whether we could find evidence of a failure of entailment in other direction. We found 
that for a range of cases involving a proximal agent P, people assented to simple causal 
statements of the form “P φ-ed Y” but were less inclined to assent to the periphrastic alternant “P 
caused Y to φ”. Our strategy for constructing these cases was to draw on the idea that causal 
attribution is often bound up with attribution of responsibility. In the cases we constructed, it was 
natural to interpret a distal agent, rather than the proximal agent, as responsible for the outcome. 
Accordingly, we found that for a distal agent D, people assented to “D caused Y to φ” but were 
less inclined to assent to “D φ-ed Y”. In effect, we find a double dissociation between special 
causal verbs, like “burn”, and “cause”. For many scenarios, “X caused Y to φ” neither entails nor 
is entailed by “X φ-ed Y”. 
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 Our results are naturally interpreted as indicating that many special causal verbs implicate 
a production-based notion of causation.  Most production accounts of causation deny that 
absences and double preventers count as causation, and we found that people’s judgments about 
special causal verbs pattern in this way. Of course, we aren’t the first to suggest that 
commonsense fundamentally trades in production-based notions of causation.   Perhaps the most 
prominent advocate is Phillip Wolff, who has developed an analysis of causal terms (“cause”, 
“prevent”, and “allow”) in terms of forces. For instance, “X caused Y” implies that X (the 
affector) exerted a force on Y (the patient) that was counter to the existing tendency of Y (see, 
e.g. Wolff 2007, Wolff et al. 2010). We resonate with Wolff’s enthusiasm for production 
theories, and our own efforts have been to expand the reach of production theories into special 
causal verbs. However, there is a critical point on which we diverge from Wolff – the treatment 
of causation by absence. Although many theorists take causation by absence to be a problem for 
production theories, Wolff et al. (2010) develop a treatment of causation by absence which they 
take to be broadly consistent with production theories. On their proposal:  
absences are causal when the removal or non-realization of an anticipated force leads to 
an effect. To illustrate this idea, consider a situation in which a car is held off the ground 
by a jack. A man pushes the jack aside – removing the force holding up the car – and the 
car falls to the ground. The situation instantiates a type of causation by absence, as 
indicated by the acceptability of the description, “The lack of a Jack cause the car to fall 
to the ground" (p. 193).  
In brief, the idea is that the removal of a pre-existing force counts as a cause. A series of studies 
appears to provide support for this proposal (Wolff et al. 2010; cf. Khemlani et al. 2018).  
Wolff and colleagues’ account thus attempts to provide a production-like explanation of 
judgments that absences are causes. Although this has the virtue of being a unified theory of 
causal judgment, it comes at the cost of rejecting a core intuition behind production accounts: 
namely, that there can be no causation by absence because absences don’t actually produce 
anything. Our own approach has been to respect the intuition that absences can’t be causes. And 
when we look at special causal verbs, we find that people are more inclined to demur from 
causation by absence. More importantly, Wolff and colleagues’ theory of causation-by-absence 
doesn’t explain why we find differences between judgments of absence causation for simple 
causal statements and periphrastic ones.  
 As noted, taken together, our studies suggest that there is a double dissociation between 
special causal verbs like “break” and “cause” and their periphrastic alternants. While people 
allow causation by absence and prevention in the case of “cause”, they tend to reject these kinds 
of causation in the case of “break”. And study 4 indicated that for some cases people would 
affirm that an individual broke something while denying that he “caused it to break”. We take 
these results to point towards a pluralist account of causal attribution, since it seems that different 
criteria are used to evaluate a sentence like “X broke Y" and one like “X caused Y to break”. But 
the kind of pluralism suggested by our results differs from prevailing proposals. 
A number of philosophers have promoted causal pluralism where, as Godfrey Smith, 
notes, the pluralism always seems to amount to N = 2 (e.g., Godfrey-Smith, 2010; Hall, 2004; 
Sober 1984).  These proposals, such as Hall’s (2004), typically proceed by noting that some 
cases (e.g., late preemption and overdetermination) seem to support  a production-based notion 
of causation and others (e.g., absences and double prevention) seem to support a dependence-
based notion of causation.  And having noted the persistent failure to provide a unified treatment, 
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the proposal is that we have two different concepts that track two fundamentally different kinds 
of causal relations, a relation of dependence and a relation of production.   
In psychology, Tania Lombrozo has developed a somewhat different version of causal 
pluralism (2010). Lombrozo doesn’t pronounce on whether there are two fundamentally different 
kinds of causal relations. But she concurs with the idea that we operate with two concepts of 
causation – a production-based concept and a dependence-based concept. Whether one or the 
other is elicited depends on whether an event is viewed in teleological or mechanistic terms. 
More specifically, if an event is viewed teleologically—in intentional, goal-directed terms—then 
people should be more inclined to make causal judgments that fit familiar patterns of dependence 
than if the event is viewed mechanistically or as accidental. Lombrozo's results on double 
prevention cases support this claim. When the double preventer is clearly seeking a goal, people 
are more inclined to say that she was a cause than when the double preventer's contribution to the 
outcome is accidental (Lombrozo 2010, pgs. 311-313). 
Our study 3 replicated Lombrozo’s finding that participants tend to say that Carol (a 
double preventer) “caused the music to start” when Carol acted intentionally. This fits with 
Lombrozo’s pluralist theory according to which people deploy the dependence-notion of 
causation when the relevant agent acted intentionally. But importantly, in this very same case 
where Carol acted intentionally, people did not say that Carol “started the music”. This suggests 
that for some special causal verbs—including “start”—people do not think of the causal relation 
in terms of dependence, even under conditions of goal-directed action. 
The word “cause” does seem to be importantly connected to teleology (Lombrozo, 2010; 
Rose, 2017) and responsibility (Sytsma et al. 2019).  We built on these ideas in developing study 
4. Insofar as identifying a person as a cause communicates responsibility for the effect, we 
hypothesized that a person might count as having broken something without having caused it to 
break. Conversely, someone might be identified as having caused the thing to break without 
having broken it. As noted above, our primary interest in these studies was to confirm a double 
dissociation between words like “break” and “cause”. But the results fit broadly with the 
hypothesis that “cause” is closely tied to the notion of responsibility. This is not to say that the 
expression “X caused Y to φ” will always communicate greater responsibility for an outcome 
than “X φ-ed Y". For instance, in some cases where we make a simple attribution of a special 
cause, e.g. “John burned the building to the ground" we are communicating that an action was 
done intentionally and maliciously, and we are not communicating that in the related periphrastic 
statement “John caused the building to burn to the ground”. Nonetheless, as suggested by Study 
4, it can happen that a pedestrian is not regarded as responsible for breaking a railing (since he 
was knocked into the railing by cyclist) while it’s nonetheless hard to deny that the pedestrian 
broke the railing.  
 In any case, we’re suggesting that part of the reason it has seemed that causal judgment is 
not about production is because researchers have focused on the word “cause”. .  “Cause” might 
well track intentions and goals, be prompted by responsibility, and display patterns that looks to 
reflect dependence. But a stock of special causal verbs operate very differently and in ways that 
appear to be better captured by a production-based notion.  
There is of course a long-standing challenge from research on causal perception against 
the idea that ordinary notions of causation can be captured in terms of dependence. Michotte 
found that people’s visual impression of causal launching depends on very specific kinds of 
visual inputs. Schlottman and Shanks (1992) found that people’s judgments of perceptual 
causality (whether it seemed like X caused Y) come apart from their judgments of causal 
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dependencies (whether X is necessary for Y to happen) (though see e.g., Gerstenberg et al., 
2017). This suggests that people operate with a notion of causation that fits better with 
production theories than dependence theories (see also Bullock 1985; Leslie, 1984; Saxe and 
Carey, 2006; Saxe, Tenebaum, and Carey, 2005; Saxe, Tzelnic and Carey, 2007). As Woodward 
(2011) notes, these results might encourage the view that there are two concepts of causation (p. 
244).12 In particular, Woodward suggests that the responses to questions about perceived 
causality might be taken to reflect a “mechanical” notion of causation that diverges from the 
dependence notion. He writes, “‘Mechanical’ in this context is not easy to define, but, roughly, it 
at least includes, at the level of folk physics, those causal relationships which physical objects 
enter into in virtue of their possession of properties like solidity, rigidity, and impenetrability” (p. 
235). This mechanical notion of causation, of course, has a strong affinity to productive notions. 
Although the work in causal perception provides a further reason to doubt that 
commonsense thinking about causation is uniformly dependence-based, Woodward raises an 
important limitation of extant work on causal perception. It’s possible that when people report 
their causal perception, they are not reporting anything like a causal judgment. Rather, it’s 
possible that when participants have an experience of a causal launching that defies known 
dependencies, they regard their perception of launching as a kind of illusion. When I look at the 
Muller-Lyer illusion, I register that the two lines appear to be different in length, but my explicit 
judgment does not conform to that (I know better). Woodward suggests that it’s possible that 
something similar holds for the relation between causal perception and causal judgment. That is, 
perhaps people regard their own perceptions of causation as illusory under conditions where 
dependence fails. Woodward is cautious not to dismiss the causal perception studies on these 
grounds. But his point exposes a gap between causal perception and causal judgment, suggesting 
that we would do well to have an additional source of evidence, beyond causal perception, to 
support the idea that people operate at least partly with a production-based notion of cause.  
Our studies using special causal verbs like “crack” and “burn” might provide this kind of 
additional source of evidence that people do, at least sometimes, operate with production-based 
notions of causation. In keeping with prior work on causal judgment, we used vignette studies. 
As a result, our studies aren’t vulnerable to the charge that we are measuring people’s reports of 
causal appearances or illusions rather than their actual causal judgments. Thus, consonant with 
the spirit of the causal perception work, our studies reveal that people treat many special causal 
concepts in ways that fit with production accounts rather than dependence accounts of causation. 
The work with special causal verbs reveals a different limitation of the causal perception 
research. Causal perception represents a very thin slice of causal cognition. Properties like 
solidity and impenetrability, and causal relations like collisions and launchings are undeniably an 
important part of our causal world, but they offer a highly circumscribed set of cases. If causal 
perception provides the only commonsense ground for production theories, dependence theories 
can take comfort in the fact that most commonsense talk of causation is not tied to immediate 
causal perceptions. However, by expanding the vignette studies to include special causal verbs, 
we find a much broader swath of commonsense causal cognition that seems to fit better with a 
production theory than dependence theories. For special causal verbs are highly heterogeneous. 
Causal perception studies have focused on collisions. Special causal verbs, of course, include 
verbs for the relations we see in causal perception studies, like “bump”, “launch”, and “pull”. 
But they also include verbs that pick out different causal relations than we find in causal 
 
12 Woodward (2011) is ultimately skeptical that there are two concepts here, but he acknowledges that these results 
might encourage the view that there are two concepts (p. 244). 
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perception studies, like “burn”, “melt”, “bend”, “flood”, and “spill”. Indeed when we turn to 
special causal verbs, we find a rich array of potentially productive causes (see Levin 1993 for an 
extensive list of such causative verbs). 
What does this mean for how many concepts of causation there are? It's unclear how one 
goes about counting concepts. But our studies suggest that the answer is, more than one. For as 
we saw, the special causal notion “break” doubly dissociates from “cause”. In certain contexts, 
people will assent to “X broke Y” but not “X caused Y to break”; in other contexts, they will 
assent to “X caused Y to break” but not “X broke Y”. This also, of course, indicates that “cause” 
does not simply specify some very abstract relation that holds wherever some special-cause 
relation holds. “Cause” seems to be special in its own way, perhaps tied to notions of 
responsibility. But it’s not obvious that the plurality of causal concepts ends here. Advocates for 
production-notions of causation can point to the work on causal perception as evidence that we 
have a notion of collision that is productive and not merely dependence-based. However, it might 
be a mistake to focus narrowly on such low-level phenomena. Aristotle, in On Generation and 
Corruption, criticized the atomists for reducing all causation to collisions; for we also observe 
crucial causal processes, like growth, that are not mere collisions. When we examine special 
causal verbs, a similar lesson suggests itself. Just as “cause” and “break” pick out two different 
relations, “grow”, “worry”, and “burn” might each pick out additional different causal relations, 
none of which can be captured in terms of dependencies. 
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